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Michael R. Matthews
1 Constructivism as a theory of knowledge,
learning  and  instruction  has  been  the
major  theoretical  influence  in
contemporary  science  and  mathematics
education;  and  in  its  post-modernist  and
deconstructionist  form,  it  is  a  significant
influence in literary,  artistic,  history and
religious education. Its impact is evident in
theoretical  debates,  curriculum
construction,  and pedagogical  practice  in
all of these subjects. It is of course not just
a  single  unified  theory  but  a  broad
scholarly  programme  of  many
philosophical and pedagogical hues, 1 so it
needs  be  understood  that  not  all  of  the
following commentary is applicable across
the  whole  constructivist  spectrum,
nevertheless  the criticisms are applicable
in the identified cases that are dealt with
and readers can judge for themselves the
more  general  applicability  of  the  anti-
constructivist arguments outlined here.
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I. Some History: The Rising Tide of Constructivism
2 Constructivism  has  been  the  rising  tide  in  education  that  floated  a  range  of  child-
centered, multicultural, feminist, and self-styled progressive and supposedly reformist
programmes  such  as  queerism  (the  view  that  there  are  uniquely  homosexual
understandings of knowledge and the world) in education. These programmes typically
have  philosophical  and  pedagogical  dimensions,  both  of  which  rise  with,  and  are
supported by,  constructivist  theory.  This  is  because constructivism typically presents
itself  both as a theory of learning (a psychological theory),  a theory of knowledge (a
philosophical, and specifically epistemological, theory) and even an ontological theory
(frequently idealism, the world and its structures are as we create them).
3 So  for  example  one  can  readily  detect  the  formative  and  legitimating  influence  of
constructivism in current Queer theory where two researchers claim that: « Using the
lens of queer theory,  we can view the hegemonic matrix,  interrupt hetero-normative
thinking,  and  broaden  all  students’  potential  for  interpreting,  representing,  and
perceiving experiences » (Snyder et Broadway, 2004, p. 621). They maintain that Queer
theory « is both ontological and epistemological as it questions knowing and the nature of
being » (Snyder et Broadway, 2004, p. 619). And proceed to assert that « Truth of nature,
then, becomes cultural interpretations of meaning » (Snyder et Broadway, 2004, p. 623).
None of this strikes a discordant note to constructivist ears; indeed it is music to their
ears,  it  is  what  constructivists  predict  and  endorse  –  everybody  moves  to  different
educational and epistemological beats.
4 This is not the place for a detailed history of Constructivism but going back ten and
twenty  years,  to  the  mid-1980s  through  to  the  late  1990s,  there  is  no  doubt  that
constructivism was  a  dominant  influence  in  the  theory,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  the
practice, of science and mathematics education; this period might be thought of as the
high tide of constructivism. Countless science education conference presentations and
plenary  addresses,  as  well  as  numberless  professional  development  workshops,  were
given over to articulating all of the many dimensions of Constructivism.
5 In a  review article  at  the time,  Peter  Fensham claimed that  « The most  conspicuous
psychological  influence  on  curriculum  thinking  in  science  since  1980  has  been  the
constructivist view of learning » (Fensham, 1992, p. 801). A former president of the US
National Association for Research in Science Teaching (NARST) said at that time that: « A
unification  of  thinking,  research,  curriculum  development,  and  teacher  education
appears to now be occurring under the theme of constructivism [...] there is a lack of
polarised debate » (Yeany, 1991, p. 1). Another past president of the same organisation
wrote that « there is a paradigm war waging in education. Evidence of conflict is seen in
nearly  every  facet  of  educational  practice.  [but]  there  is  evidence  of  widespread
acceptance of alternatives to objectivism, one of which is constructivism » (Tobin, 1993, p.
ix).
6 A review of research in mathematics education noted that « In the second half of the
1980s public statements urging the introduction of radical constructivist ideas in school
mathematics  programs  also  began  to  assume  bandwagon  proportions »  (Ellerton  et
Clements, 1991, p. 58). One authoritative bibliography at the time listed more than 1,100
studies informed by constructivist theoretical frameworks (Pfundt et Duit, 1991). There
are  even  more  in  the  2009  version  prepared  by  Duit  and  available  on  line  <http://
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omnis.if.ufrj.br/~marta/aprendizagememfisica/stcse-introduction.pdf>.  He  says  of  the
bibliography that:
This research has been carried out within what is called the constructivist view
including  individual  constructivist  and  social  constructivist  perspectives.  The
bibliography  may  therefore  now  be  viewed  as  an  attempt  to  document
constructivist research in science education.
7 In the early 1990s an Editorial in The Journal of Teacher Education announced that:
Constructivism is the new rallying theme in education. Its popularity derives from
its origins in a variety of disciplines, notably philosophy of science, psychology, and
sociology.  The  implications  of  a  constructivist  perspective  for  education  differ
depending  on  its  disciplinary  foundation,  but  professional  education  groups  as
diverse as the National Association for the Education of Young Children and the
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics have based revisions of their
standards  for  practice  on  the  constructivist  assumption  that  learners  do  not
passively absorb knowledge but rather construct it from their experiences (Ashton,
1992, p. 322).
8 Speaking of US science and mathematics education reforms at the time, Catherine Fosnot
commented that « Most recent reforms advocated by national professional groups are
based on constructivism. For example the National Council for Teachers of Mathematics
[…] and […] the National Science Teachers Association » (Fosnot, 1996, p. x).
Another observer supported Fosnot’s account writing that:
As any glance at contemporary educational literature demonstrates, the concept of
« constructivism » carries with it enormous appeal. Contemporary literature also
reveals  that  many  current  educational  reform  initiatives  encourage  teaching
practices that many people refer to as constructivist (Null, 2004, p. 80).
 
II. Constructivist Impact on Research and Classrooms
9 Constructivist  theory  has  had  an  impact  on  education  way  beyond  the  confines  of
research journals and scholarly conferences that can be documented in ERIC searches; it
has been adopted as the « official » pedagogical theory in a number of countries, states
and provinces. These include at least the following: Ontario Province of Canada, Thailand,
Greece,  Turkey,  New  Zealand,  India,  Taiwan,  Spain,  the  Australian  state  of  Western
Australia, and some states and school districts of the USA. Constructivism is ubiquitous in
North American teacher education programmes.
10 As the Constructivist tide rose, it  progressively occupied more and more educational,
philosophical and cultural space. Although constructivism began with Piaget, Vygotsky
and Bruner as a theory of learning and hence a moderately limited psychological theory it
fairly quickly became a theory of teaching, a theory of education, a theory of the origin of
ideas,  and a  theory of  both personal  knowledge and scientific  knowledge.  It  became
education’s answer to physics’ « Grand Unified Theory ».
11 The range of territories into which constructivism expanded as its tide rose can be seen
in  the  subheadings  of  just  one  article:  « A  constructivist  view  of  learning »,  « A
constructivist view of teaching », « A view of science », « Aims of science education », « A
constructivist  view  of  curriculum »  and  « A  constructivist  view  of  curriculum
development » (Bell, 1991).
12 For some, constructivism is even larger than a theory of learning, education and science;
it is a worldview or weltanschuung. Yvon Pépin, stated that constructivism: « also offers a
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global perspective on the meaning of the human adventure, on the way human beings
impart meaning to their whole existence in order to survive and adapt » (Pépin, 1998, p.
174). Whilst another constructivist wrote: 
To become a constructivist is to use constructivism as a referent for thoughts and
actions.  That  is  to  say  when  thinking  or  acting,  beliefs  associated  with
constructivism assume a higher value than other beliefs. For a variety of reasons
the process is not easy (Tobin, 1991, p. 1).
13 In  Tobin’s  formulation,  Constructivism becomes  an  ideology.  In  the  above  quotation
« constructivism »  can  be  replaced  with  « communism »,  « Catholicism »,  « Islam »,
« Liberalism » and most other isms without any necessity to change the structure of the
statement.
 
III. Constructivist Entanglement of Psychology and
Philosophy
14 Constructivism is presented as both as a theory of learning (a psychological theory) and a
theory of knowledge (a philosophical, and specifically epistemological, theory). It is self-
consciously a composite theory. A typical account of the theory is given by Catherine
Fosnot in a much-cited constructivist anthology:
Constructivism is a theory about knowledge and learning; it describes both what
« knowing »  is  and  how  one  « comes  to  know ».  Based  on  work  in  psychology,
philosophy, science and biology, the theory describes knowledge not as truths to be
transmitted or discovered, but as emergent, developmental, non-objective, viable
constructed explanations by humans engaged in meaning-making in cultural and
social communities of discourse. Learning from this perspective is viewed as a self-
regulatory process of struggling with the conflict between existing personal models
of the world and discrepant new insights,  constructing new representations and
models of reality as a human meaning-making venture with culturally developed
tools  and  symbols,  and  further  negotiating  such  meaning  through  cooperative
social activity, discourse, and debate in communities of practice.
Although constructivism is not a theory of teaching, it suggests taking a radically
different approach to instruction from that used in most schools (Fosnot, 2005, p.
ix).
15 This  characterisation  of  constructivism  as  being  a  composite  of  learning  theory
(psychology) with theory of knowledge (philosophy) is apparent in the writing of the
founders of educational constructivism – Piaget, Vygotsky and Bruner. Piaget called his
own theory « Genetic Epistemology », and this philosophical concern is reflected in the
title  of  one  of  his  books  –  Psychology  and  Epistemology (Piaget,  1972).  Jerome Bruner
speaking  of  his  famous  Process  of  Education book  (Bruner,  1960)  that  presented  a
constructivist  alternative to didactic,  transmissionist,  behaviourist-informed pedagogy
wrote that:
Its ideas sprang from epistemology and the sciences of knowing […] all of us were, I
think, responding to the same « epistemic » malaise, the doubts about the nature of
knowing  that  had  come  first  out  of  the  revolution  in  physics  and  then  been
formalized and amplified by philosophy (Bruner, 1983, p. 186).
16 It  is  important  to  recognise  a  persistent  ambiguity  in  the  constructivist  linking  of
learning theory to epistemology. The founders of constructivism regarded epistemology
seriously as a philosophical endeavour; they offered accounts of what constitutes human
knowledge and how knowledge claims were compared and tested. But subsequently many
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in  the  constructivist  tradition  simply  collapse  epistemology  into  psychology,  and
although  they  talk  about  studying  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  they  really  mean
studying the acquisition of beliefs. One such example occurs in a recent book of Andreas
Quale,  Radical  Constructivism (Quale,  2008).  Quale says learning is  the process through
which we gain knowledge and knowledge is the product of the learning process (p. 45). He
of course recognises, with Plato and the bulk of the philosophical and commonsensical
tradition, that « it is possible to learn things that are not true » (p. 45); but this is not a
bother to him because « such an association of  knowledge with truth is  not made in
constructivism » (p. 45).
17 Indeed this is a problem that constructivists share with many cognitive psychologists for
whom knowledge is merely « whatever can be retrieved from long-term memory », and
for whom « social knowledge exists in long-term memory ».
18 But merely saying that there is no problem in identifying learning with knowledge does
not mean that there is no problem. In children’s books a threat might go away because a
person closes their eyes, but this comforting event seldom happens in the real world, or
in the world of philosophical argument. Everyday, all around the world, people learn all
sorts of silly and plainly false things regarding both the natural and social worlds. Think
of widespread and entrenched superstitions and magical beliefs current in all cultures.
Think of what children learn everyday about the solar system by just watching the sun go
around the earth.  Think of  lessons in Taliban schools,  in North Korean re-education
camps,  in  fundamentalist  school  biology  classes,  in  AIDS-denying  South  African
communities, in Roman Catholic seminaries, and so on. Think of the millions of Chinese
citizens who not so long ago were taught and assiduously learnt Chairman Mao thought;
the millions of Soviet citizens who learnt Stalinist dialectics; and the millions of German
citizens who learnt National-Socialist science. Pretty much all of what was learnt in these
foregoing  examples  was  simply  wrong,  but  for  many personal  constructivists  it  is
nevertheless  knowledge simply in virtue of  it  being learnt,  and for more demanding
social constructivists, it is knowledge in virtue of the beliefs being widely shared and
efficacious. And there is no doubt they are embedded in long-term memory: prizes and
honours were bestowed on students for learning off by heart the « Thoughts of Chairman
Mao », whole chapters of the Koran or whole sections of the Roman Catholic Catechism.
19 Constructivists typically do not like or advocate such rote learning, but the problem, to
repeat, is their breaking of the « association of knowledge with truth » as Quale explicitly
does above. It truth goes, then there is a long queue of alternatives lined up to take its
place:  personal  advancement,  social  cohesion,  economic  gain,  religious  conformity,
national honour and so forth. In all of the foregoing cases, something has been learnt,
indeed very well learnt, and for constructivists, if it has been learnt, it is knowledge;
there is no other court of appeal, certainly not the court of nature or social reality.
 
IV. An Evidential Dilemma
20 There is a clear « Evidential Dilemma » for constructivists who try to support their theory
by empirical research. On the one hand they wish to appeal to the nature of cognitive
realities  (learning  processes)  and  epistemological  realities  (especially  the  history  of
science) to support their pedagogical, curricular and epistemological proposals. Yet on
the other hand they mostly  say that  such realities  cannot  be known,  or  are forever
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inaccessible  to  us.  For  many  constructivists,  reality  collapses  into  the  completely
subjective « my experience of reality ».2
21 Thus one researcher who champions « socio-transformative constructivism » (STC), and
who supports the position with a study of 18 students in a secondary science methods
class, is impelled to remark that:
Note  that  by  using  the  term  empirical  evidence,  I  am  not  taking  a  realist  or
empiricist stance, nor any other Western orientation. I  use the term « empirical
evidence »  with  the  understanding  that  knowledge  is  socially  constructed  and
always  partial.  By  « empirical  evidence »  I  mean  that  information  was
systematically gathered and exposed to a variety of methodology checks. Hence in
this study I do not pretend to capture the real world of the research participants
(realism), nor do I pretend to capture their experiential world (empiricism). What I
do attempt is to provide spaces where the participants’ voices and subjectivities are
represented along with my own voice and subjectivities (Rodriguez, 1998, p. 618).
22 One can get the general drift of this quotation, namely that there is no « uncontested »
evidence, but instead of trying to get more adequate evidence, the author proposes that
research should: « provide spaces where the participants » voices and subjectivities are
represented  along  with  my  own  voice  and  subjectivities.  As  a  guide  to  educational
research, this is completely opaque. Unfortunately such mystification has become the
coin of the constructivist realm.
 
V. Epistemological Skepticism
23 All constructivists are epistemological relativists; it simply goes with the constructivist
territory to deny that one account or theory can be better than another (with « better »
inevitably  placed  in  scare  quotes  by  constructivists),  and  likewise  to  deny  that  one
account might be more true than another.3 Although epistemological relativism has its
problems,4 it  is not the most serious epistemological problem for constructivism. The
really serious problem is not relativism but skepticism.
24 Constructivists constantly assert the sceptical thesis that we have no direct access to
reality, that reality remains forever hidden. Antonio Bettencourt, for example, puts the
matter this way:
[...] constructivism, like idealism, maintains that we are cognitively isolated from
the nature of reality. [...] Our knowledge is, at best, a mapping of transformations
allowed by that reality (Bettencourt, 1993, p. 46).
25 Leaving aside the problem of understanding what is meant by the second half of the
claim,  the  first  half  –  « cognitive  isolation »  –  resonates  throughout  constructivist
writing.
26 Cognitive  isolation from the  world  is  a  fundamental  tenet  of  Ernst  von Glasersfeld’s
radical constructivism. It is affirmed in just about all of his publications, with one clear
statement being:
To claim true knowledge of the world, you would have to be certain that the picture
you compose on the basis of your perceptions and conceptions is in every respect a
true representation of the world as it really is. But in order to be certain that it is a
good  match,  you  should  be  able  to  compare  the  representation  to  what  it  is
supposed to represent. This, however you cannot do, because you cannot step out of
your human ways of perceiving and conceiving (von Glasersfeld 1995, p. 26).
27 Paul Cobb has written that:
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Constructivism is a non-representationist model of knowing in which the mental
representations that people construct are regarded as learning with no necessary
correspondence with an objective and a priori scientific ontology (Cobb, 1994, p.
13).
28 Philip Kitcher calls this assertion the The Inaccessibility of  Reality Argument,  or IRA for
short. He says of it that: « the IRA is a terrorist weapon which anti-realists employ with
enormous confidence » (Kitcher, 2001, p. 156). It has of course been utilised by many in
the philosophic tradition: the British Empiricists, Continental Idealists, Logical Positivists,
and  more  recently  Nelson  Goodman,  Hilary  Putnam  and  Richard  Rorty.  So  the
constructivist recourse to IRA is not without honourable pedigree.
29 But  there  have  also  been  equally  honourable  opponents of  IRA  in  philosophy.5 The
opposing, « common sense realism », view was nicely stated by Moritz Schlick, in 1935.
Against Carnap and Neurath, his fellow positivists, he stated:
I have been accused of maintaining that statements can be compared with facts. I
plead guilty. I have maintained this. But I protest against my punishment: I refuse
to sit in the seat of the metaphysicians. I have often compared propositions to facts;
so I had no reason to suppose that it couldn't be done. I found, for instance, in my
Baedeker the statement: « this cathedral has two spires ». I was able to compare it
with « reality » by looking at the cathedral, and this comparison convinced me that
Baedeker's assertion was true (Schlick, 1935, p. 65-66).
30 Schlick’s « tourist » argument of course applies at the next level down. Viruses, bacteria,
molecules and a host of microscopic entities were once only postulated and were indeed
inaccessible to scientists and everyone else, but with refined technology they become as
visible to students in laboratories as were Schlick’s cathedral spires to the tourist walking
through town.
The IRA thesis is not as « uncontestable » as constructivists make it out to be; it has been
contested and found severely wanting.6
 
VI. Ontological Idealism
31 Constructivists frequently combine the foregoing skeptical epistemological position with
an idealist ontological position. Constructivists often enough make an ontological nod
towards realism by saying that there is an external world, but they frequently go on to
say that this supposed reality is created by the knowing subject. This is classical idealism,
but  its  constant  restatement  does  not  seem  to  worry  constructivists.  Ernst  von
Glasersfeld,  the  radical  constructivist  who  has  had  an  enormous  influence  on
contemporary science education research, wrote:
I can no more walk through the desk in front of me than I can argue that black is
white at one and the same time. What constrains me, however, is not quite the
same thing in the two cases. That the desk constitutes an obstacle to my physical
movement is due to the particular distinctions my sensor system enables me to
make and to the particular way in which I have come to coordinate them. Indeed, if
I now could walk through the desk, it would no longer fit the abstraction I have
made in prior experience (von Glasersfeld, 1990, p. 24).
32 This sounds profound and deep, but the argument is flawed, and obviously so. For the
realist, the inability of our body to « walk through » another body has nothing to do with
our sensory powers, but everything to do with the composition and structures of the
bodies. Changing our sensory powers will no more allow us to walk through a hitherto
impenetrable table, than changing our shirt would allow us to. Upon dying we lose all
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sensory powers, but this does not mean our body can then penetrate a table; our having
or not having sensory powers makes no difference to the penetrability of the table; to
think that it does is just philosophical idealism.
John Staver, a very prominent constructivist, put the idealist position as follows:
[…] For constructivists, observations, objects, events, data, laws, and theory do not
exist  independently  of  observers.  The  lawful  and  certain  nature  of  natural
phenomena  are  properties  of  us,  those  who  describe,  not  of  nature,  that  is
described (Staver, 1998, p. 503).
33 Again, this is a flawed position. Observations clearly depend upon us, but not the objects
observed nor their structures. Philosophical alarm bells should ring when an author runs
together « observations » with « events » and « objects ». For a realist, and for any serious
scientist,  there are categorical differences between these classes. Only a philosophical
idealist can run them together without alarm bells ringing.
34 Rosalind  Driver,  another  very  famous  and  influential  science  educator,  frequently
affirmed the idealist position. For instance she wrote:
[…]  science  as  public  knowledge  is  not  so  much  a  « discovery »  as  a  carefully
checked  « construction »  […]  and  that  scientists  construct  theoretical  entities
(magnetic  fields,  genes,  electron  orbitals…)  which  in  turn  take  on  a  « reality »
(Driver, 1988, p. 137).
35 So  the  earth  does  not  have  a  structure  geophysicists  impose  it;  there  is  not  an
evolutionary structure in the animal world till biologists impose such structure; atoms
have no structure until such is imposed by physicists; and so on. If gravity waves are our
creation, why spend so much time and money looking for them?
36 This idealist philosophical tradition has its critics. As with the IRA position, idealism has
its problems, to put not too fine a point on it.
37 Despite Driver’s basic argument form being fallacious, it is nevertheless wide-spread. The
argument has the form:
Premise: Some concept is a human construction.
Conclusion: Therefore the reference of the concept does not exist.
38 One only has to state this argument to see that it is an invalid inference, and its validity
depends upon making explicit a suppressed premise of the form:
39 Suppressed premise: All concepts that are human constructions can have no existential
reference.
But this suppressed premise is simply dogma for which no evidence is provided. Not only
are « electron orbitals » and « magnetic fields » human constructions,  but so also are
« my house », « mountain », « table » and all the other observational terms we use. If the
foregoing widespread constructivist argument, utilised by Rosalind Driver, were valid,
then not only would electron orbitals not exist, neither would our house, the tables in it,
or mountains that we might live near. Indeed, given that the personal pronoun « I » is a
human  construction,  we  might  not  exist  ourselves!  But  such  considerations  are
frequently dismissed as « philosophical quibbles ».
40 To conclude,  philosophical  mistakes  of  constructivists,  mistakes  that  make  it  simply
incompatible with the pursuit of both science and science learning are first its deep-
rooted epistemological scepticism and second its ontological idealism. Both these matters
were  raised  and  comprehensively  argued  some  twenty  years  ago  by  the  Australian
Philosophical and Pedagogical Problems with Constructivism in Science Education
Tréma, 38 | 2012
8
philosopher Wallis Suchting who concluded a long and detailed analysis of Ernst von
Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism with the judgement that:
First, much of the doctrine known as « constructivism » [...] is simply unintelligible.
Second, to the extent that it is intelligible [...] it is simply confused. Third, there is a
complete absence of any argument for whatever positions can be made out. [...] In
general, far from being what it is claimed to be, namely, the New Age in philosophy
of science, an even slightly perceptive ear can detect the familiar voice of a really
quite  primitive,  traditional  subjectivistic  empiricism  with  some  overtones  of
diverse provenance like Piaget and Kuhn (Suchting, 1992, p. 247).
41 Disappointingly, this article has largely been ignored by educational constructivists.
 
VII. Problems with Constructivist Pedagogy
42 Most  constructivists  see  a  connection  between constructivist  theory  of  learning  and
knowledge on the one hand and pedagogical advice for teachers on the other. This is why
constructivism has become so widely adopted in teacher education programmes around
the world. One response to criticism of constructivist theory is to say that although the
theory might be poorly articulated and even be philosophically problematic, nevertheless
constructivist pedagogy is valuable and should be supported (Grandy, 1997). This position
is understandable, but it rests on a moot point: How efficacious is constructivist pedagogy
in teaching science? A good deal of research says that it is not very effective at all.
43 Many science educators are interested in finding out how, on constructivist principles,
somebody teaches a body of scientific knowledge that is in large part abstract (depending
on notions such as velocity,  acceleration,  force,  gene,  vectors),  that is  removed from
experience (propositions about atomic structure, cellular processes, astronomic events),
that has no connection with prior conceptions (ideas of viruses, antibodies, molten core,
evolution, electromagnetic radiation), and that is alien to common-sense, and in conflict
with everyday experience,  expectations and concepts? Teaching a body of knowledge
involves not just teaching and explaining the concepts of science, but also the method,
and something of  the  methodology or  theory of  method –  how scientific  claims are
vindicated, proved or established; how alternative theories and hypotheses are appraised;
how data relates to theory and vice versa. How all of this is to be taught, without teachers
actually conveying something to pupils,  is a moot point. Just as it is impossible for a
person to learn to play chess without the rules of chess in some way being conveyed to
him or her, so to with science; the rules and methodologies cannot just be made up by the
individual. So the rule « it is true because I want it to be » is simply not an allowable rule
and students need to be taught that.
Rosalind Driver and colleagues correctly maintain that:
[…] learning science involves being initiated into the culture of science. If learners
are  to  be  given  access  to  the  knowledge  systems  of  science,  the  process  of
knowledge construction must go beyond personal empirical enquiry. Learners need
to be given access not only to physical experiences but also to the concepts and
models of conventional science (Scott et al., 1994, p. 6).
44 But having made the above claim they go on to say that:
The challenge for teachers lies in helping learners to construct these models for
themselves, to appreciate their domains of applicability and, within such domains,
to use them.
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45 One might reasonably ask whether, at this point, learning theory, or ideology, is simply
getting in the way of good teaching. Why must learners construct for themselves the
ideas of potential energy, mutation, linear inertia, photosynthesis, valency, and so on?
Why not explain these ideas to students, and do it in such a way that they understand
them?  This  process  may  or  may  not  be  didactic:  it  all  depends  on  the  classroom
circumstance. There are many ways to explain science: didacticism is just one of them.
46 The supposed efficacy of constructivist, or minimally-guided, pedagogy has recently been
challenged by educational researchers. Richard Mayer, a past-President of the Division of
Educational Psychology of the American Psychological Association, a former editor of the
Educational Psychologist and a former co-editor of Instructional Science, in something of a
landmark study, reviewed an extensive body of research on constructivist pedagogy and
concluded that it did not work, and where it did work, it worked in virtue of departing
from constructivist principles (Mayer, 2004). His analysis was confirmed by Kirschner,
Sweller and Clark who, in another review article, argued that:
[…] the past half century of research on this issue has provided overwhelming and
unambiguous evidence that unguided or minimally guided learning is significantly
less effective and efficient than guidance that is specifically designed to support the
cognitive processing necessary for learning. Not only is minimally-guided learning
ineffective  for  most  learners,  it  may  even  be  harmful  for  some  […].  The  best
evidence developed over the past half century supports the view that minimally-
guided learning does not enhance student achievement any more than throwing a
non-swimmer out of a boat in the middle of a deep lake supports learning to swim
(Kirschner, Sweller et Clark, 2006, p. 75).
47 Such conclusions seem obvious,  and dictated by the very nature of  the discipline of
science. Someone learning to play chess has to be told the rules by someone who knows
the rules; learners cannot make up the rules, they cannot negotiate the rules, and even if
they brainstorm to the conclusion that rooks can move diagonally, this does not mean
that rooks can so move in a formal game of chess. Knowledge of what is allowed and not
allowed in chess has to be transmitted; further competence in chess depends not just on
knowing the rules, but on guidance and worked examples; so to in learning science.
 
VIII. Conclusion: The Ebbing Tide
48 Constructivism has done a service to science and mathematics education:  by alerting
teachers to the function of prior learning and extant concepts in the process of learning
new  material,  by  stressing  the  importance  of  understanding  as  a  goal  of  science
instruction,  by  fostering  pupil  engagement  in  lessons,  and  other  such  progressive
matters.  But  liberal  educationalists  can  rightly  say  that  these  are  pedagogical
commonplaces, the recognition of which goes back at least to Socrates. It is clear that the
best  of  constructivist  pedagogy  can  be  had  without  constructivist  epistemology  –
Socrates, Montaigne, Locke, Mill, and Russell are just some who have conjoined engaging,
constructivist-like, pedagogy with non-constructivist epistemology.
49 Constructivism  has  also  done  a  service  by  making  educators  aware  of  the  human
dimension of science: its fallibility, its connection to culture and interests, the place of
convention in scientific theory, the historicity of concepts, the complex procedures of
theory appraisal, and much else. But again realist philosophers can rightly maintain that
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constructivism does not have a monopoly on these insights. They can be found in the
work of thinkers as diverse as Mach, Duhem, Bachelard, Popper, and Polanyi.
50 However  after  sustained philosophical  criticism,7 and more  recently  refutation of  its
claims to being a guide for successful pedagogy,8 there are some signs that constructivist
influence is waning and that more realistic, limited and better grounded philosophical
and instructional claims are taking its place. Indeed one very prominent constructivist
and editor of constructivist anthologies has published an article titled « Constructivism in
Education: Moving On » (Tobin, 2000). In this he writes:
The critical mass of science educators are still making sense of their praxis in terms
of constructivism, but in a short time we will be in another theoretical epoch. […]
As an axiom, however, constructivism is the ether for an expanding constellation of
theories that illuminate my praxis in science education (p. 250-251).
51 Most physicists have given up on the ether as a serious explanatory entity, this article
will  argue that  educators,  Tobin’s  advice not  withstanding,  should do the same with
constructivism.
Physique, troisième année (enseignement primaire supérieur), ouvrage rédigé conformément aux
programmes ofﬁciels du 26 juillet 1909 et orné de 152 gravures. Chassagny, M., Carré, F., deuxième
édition. Hachette : Paris, 1918. Source : CEDRHE, 22941, p. 171.
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NOTES
1. In 1993 there were 21 differently named variants of constructivism (Good, Wandersee et St.
Julien, 1993); twenty years later there are probably as many varieties as there are of Heinz beans.
2. On the relationship between constructivism and classic empiricism, see Matthews (1992) and
Suchting (1992).
3. See Bickhard (1997) and Niiniluoto (1991).
4. See for instance Siegel (1987), Nola (1988) and Norris (1997).
5. See especially Nola (2003).
6. One extended and excellent treatment of this subject is Papayannakos (2008).
7. See especially the detailed papers of Suchting (1992), Slezak (2000), Nola (1997, 2003), Phillips
(1997), Kragh (1998), McCarty et Schwandt (2000) and Small (2003).
8. See  especially  Mayer  (2004),  Klahr  et  Nigam  (2004),  Kirschner,  Sweller  et  Clark  (2006),
Tuovinen et Sweller (1999), and contributions to Tobias et Duffy (2009).
ABSTRACTS
The  paper  will  make  two  claims:  first,  that  many  constructivists  embrace  erroneous
philosophical positions that are antithetical to the conduct of good science; and second, that
Constructivism as a theory of learning promotes ineffective pedagogy and poor student learning.
The philosophical  errors identified are those associated with skepticism in epistemology and
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idealism  in  ontology.  The  pedagogical  problem  results  from  constructivism  ignoring  or
minimising the basic point that learning is dependent upon guidance and instruction, the more
so  in  a  discipline  such  as  physics.  The  paper  will  make  some  suggestions  about  why  this
unfortunate state of affairs has come to pass in science education research.
Cet  article  avance  deux  idées:  premièrement,  de  nombreux  constructivistes  adoptent  des
positions philosophiques erronées qui sont antithétiques avec la conduite d’une bonne science;
deuxièmement, le constructivisme comme une théorie de l’apprentissage promeut une pédagogie
inefficace et un apprentissage pauvre pour les élèves. Les erreurs philosophiques identifiées sont
celles associées au scepticisme en épistémologie et à l’idéalisme dans le domaine de l’ontologie.
Le problème pédagogique provient du fait que le constructivisme ignore ou minimise le point
fondamental selon lequel l’apprentissage dépend de l’accompagnement et de l’enseignement, et
ce,  à  plus  forte  raison pour une discipline comme la  physique.  Cet  article  propose plusieurs
explications de cet état insatisfaisant dans lequel s’est retrouvée la recherche en didactique des
sciences.
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